Seis meses depois. Não está mal de todo!...
Entretenham-se então, a olhar um pouco mais longe. Nada do que é realmente importante, passa por este canto manhoso.
Vindo de um estudo encomendado pela Chatham House, a coisa é para ser levada muito a sério.
E, venha ela.
Será, seguramente acelarada, entre 3 e 6 de Junho próximo, ali, pela Costa Brava...
O documento é longo mas vale bem o tempo de leitura. Fica aqui só um cheirinho.
Expanding SDR supply
There are two routes to expanding the supply of SDRs and
both should be pursued. The first is new allocations by the
IMF to its member countries. Currently each new allocation
of SDRs requires the agreement of 85% of the votes of
IMF members. Both the United States and the combined
Eurozone countries have sufficient votes for a blocking
minority. Thus their agreement to new allocations would
be critical. It is also justified in a practical sense because
their two currencies together constitute 78% of the current
SDR basket.
However, such a structure lacks both global legitimacy
and political independence. Therefore it should be
augmented by a new committee, perhaps called the
International Monetary Policy Committee (IMPC), which
would produce a regular recommendation to the IMF
board for an allocation of new SDRs to member governments’
accounts based on its independent analysis of the
state of global economic growth, inflation prospects and
financial stability indicators.
The IMPC should be chaired by the Managing
Director of the IMF and composed of the heads of the
four central banks whose currencies make up the SDR,
along with four other term-limited individuals chosen on
the basis of their economic expertise and, if possible,
hailing from other G20 countries whose weight in the
world economy is large or growing.5 China and Brazil are
obvious examples. Their membership on the IMPC could
be a precursor to the eventual inclusion of their currencies
in the SDR basket, at which point they would become
permanent members.
The SDR basket would be reviewed every five years in
advance of SDR rebalancing, with the economic criteria
for inclusion remaining as they are today and the political
decision left to the IMF board. Inclusion in the SDR
basket requires that the currency be freely floating and
have a substantial presence in cross-border trade or
financial transactions. It is therefore possible that the
Brazilian real could qualify in 2015 and the Chinese
renminbi in 2020.
The IMPC would meet every six months in advance of
the regular IMF board meetings. It would take decisions
by majority vote and publish both its votes and its recommendation
to the IMF board for a specific SDR allocation
(which could be zero) based on its analysis. The IMF
board could then approve or reject, but not alter, the
IMPC’s recommendation. In this way, the ultimate
authority for SDR allocations would remain with the IMF
board, while the pressures of transparency and expert
advice from the IMPC would provide a counterweight to
the threat of veto by the United States or the Eurozone
countries.
The remit of the IMPC would be to achieve a growth
in international reserves over time which is consistent
with the sustainable non-inflationary growth rate of the
world economy (generally thought to be 3–4% per
annum). Until SDRs make up a much larger share of
international reserves, these small but regular allocations
would have little effect on global liquidity.
Initially, it is likely that they would be viewed as additional
precautionary reserves, thereby reducing the
demand for ever larger dollar holdings. As a private
market in SDR use built up (as set out below), the global
liquidity implications of SDR allocations would need to
be considered by the IMPC in making its recommendation